Personal data breach notification
Pasal 46
Official copy: salinan p. 19
Yang dimaksud dengan "kegagalan Pelindungan Data Pribadi" adalah kegagalan melindungi Data Pribadi seseorang dalam hal kerahasiaan, integritas, dan ketersediaan Data Pribadi, termasuk pelanggaran keamanan, baik yang disengaja maupun tidak disengaja, yang mengarah pada perusakan, kehilangan, perubahan, pengungkapan, atau akses yang tidak sah terhadap Data Pribadi yang dikirim, disimpan, atau diproses.
Yang dimaksud dengan "dalam hal tertentu" antara lain jika kegagalan Pelindungan Data Pribadi mengganggu pelayanan publik dan/atau berdampak serius terhadap kepentingan masyarakat.
Implemented by PP 33/2026 Pasal 114 to 119.
Ayat (1) Cukup jelas. Ayat (2) Pengendali Data Pribadi dianggap telah mengetahui Kegagalan Pelindungan Data Pribadi secara pasti, patut, dan wajar berdasarkan kesimpulan dari dokumentasi yang dihasilkan oleh Pengendali Data Pribadi terhadap insiden Kegagalan Pelindungan Data Pribadi. Ayat (3) Huruf a Cukup jelas. Huruf b Kapan dan bagaimana Data Pribadi terungkap termasuk deskripsi dan dampak Kegagalan Pelindungan Data Pribadi. Huruf c Cukup jelas. Ayat (4) Cukup jelas.
Ayat (1) Huruf a Cukup jelas. Huruf b Yang dimaksud dengan "deskripsi Kegagalan Pelindungan Data Pribadi" termasuk menjelaskan kapan dan bagaimana Kegagalan Pelindungan Data Pribadi. Huruf c Cukup jelas. Huruf d Cukup jelas. Huruf e Cukup jelas. Ayat (2) Cukup jelas.
Dalam hal terjadi Kegagalan Pelindungan Data Pribadi pada pemrosesan Data Pribadi yang dilakukan oleh Prosesor Data Pribadi, Prosesor Data Pribadi harus melaporkan Kegagalan Pelindungan Data Pribadi kepada Pengendali Data Pribadi pada kesempatan pertama.
Ketentuan lebih lanjut mengenai pemberitahuan Kegagalan Pelindungan Data Pribadi diatur dalam Peraturan Lembaga.
PP Pasal 114 requires written notice within 3x24 hours, Pasal 115 adds a public notification duty where public services or the public interest are affected, Pasal 116 requires incident documentation and Pasal 117 preventive policies, with Pasal 118 covering breaches at the processor.
Both notification limbs are sanction-backed at Pasal 114(1) and 115(1), while the documentation duty at Pasal 116 is neither expressed as wajib nor listed at Pasal 184(1), so the evidentiary layer is the softest part of the regime.
diverges from the GDPRGDPR Articles 32, 33 and 34
What the GDPR provides. GDPR Article 33(1) requires notification to the supervisory authority without undue delay and where feasible within 72 hours of the controller becoming aware of a breach, unless the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to rights and freedoms.
Article 33(3) fixes the content, including the categories and approximate numbers of subjects and records, the likely consequences and the measures taken, and Article 33(4) allows the information to be supplied in phases.
Article 34(1) reaches the data subject only where the breach is likely to result in a high risk, and Article 34(3) removes even that where the data were encrypted, where the risk has since been contained, or where individual contact would take disproportionate effort, in which case a public communication substitutes. Article 33(5) requires the controller to document every breach, notified or not.
The clock is the difference that gets missed, and it is a difference about the start, not the length.
Article 33(1) runs 72 hours from the controller becoming aware, and Guidelines 9/20224 devotes a section to when awareness begins, whereas UU Pasal 46 ayat (1) fixes 3 x 24 hours against the occurrence of the kegagalan and omits the terhitung sejak formula that Pasal 41 ayat (1) uses for the restriction clock, so a controller that spends two days confirming an incident cannot tell from the statute whether it is early or already late.
PP Pasal 114 ayat (2) supplies the start the statute omits, counting from when the failure is known with certainty, properly and reasonably, and its elucidation ties that knowledge to the conclusion of the controller's own incident documentation.
Then the filters, which Indonesia does not have on either limb: the GDPR notifies the authority unless risk is unlikely and the subject only on high risk, so Pasal 46 produces notices in cases where an EU controller would document and stay silent.
The public notice is not the convergence it looks like either, because Article 34(3)(c) offers a public communication as a substitute for individual notice, while Pasal 46 ayat (3) adds one on top of the individual notice that ayat (1) huruf a already requires.
The sharpest inversion is evidential, because Article 33(5) makes the internal register of all breaches directly enforceable and fineable under Article 83(4)(a), which is how a supervisory authority audits the risk judgment behind a decision not to notify, and C-340/215 adds the litigation half, holding that in an Article 82 damages claim the controller bears the burden of proving its Article 32 measures were appropriate.
The tracker records PP Pasal 116 as neither wajib nor listed at Pasal 184(1), so Indonesia removed the discretion and also removed the record that would have tested it, which is a coherent design only for as long as no one asks what happened before the notice went out.
Commentary on each ayat, a pilot on this article and on Pasal 16, Pasal 20 and Pasal 56. Every citation in it was checked against the source it cites.
Ayat (1) requires written notice of a failure of protection to the subject and to the lembaga within 3x24 hours. PP Pasal 114 ayat (2) supplies the start the statute leaves out: the period runs from the moment the failure is known with certainty, properly and reasonably (secara pasti, patut, dan wajar). Its elucidation deems the controller to know once its own documentation of the incident reaches a conclusion.
The EDPB counts a controller as aware once it has a reasonable degree of certainty that an incident has compromised personal data, allowing a short investigation begun as soon as possible. It also reads the GDPR as obliging the controller to become aware in good time (Guidelines 9/20224, paras 31, 32 and 34). The PP sets no time for reaching a conclusion, and PP Pasal 184 ayat (1) does not list the incident documentation in PP Pasal 116.
On the elucidation's reading, the controller's own documentation fixes the start of the clock. The only check is the standard in PP Pasal 114 ayat (2) itself: knowledge that is proper and reasonable may be found to have come earlier than the paperwork says.
Huruf a is the one limb a controller may withhold. UU Pasal 50 ayat (1) excepts the notice to the subject for defence and national security, law enforcement, the public interest in running the state, and state supervision of the financial sector, monetary policy, payments and financial stability. UU Pasal 50 ayat (2) allows the exception only in carrying out a statute.
PP Pasal 149 ayat (1) repeats the exception for PP Pasal 114 ayat (1) huruf a. PP Pasal 150 to PP Pasal 153 require necessity, proportionality, a lawful basis, a balancing assessment and protective measures, and for defence and security PP Pasal 150 huruf d adds a certificate from the Lembaga or the ministry concerned.
Article 23 GDPR draws the same line: a restriction may reach the communication to the subject under Article 34 GDPR but not the notification to the authority under Article 33 GDPR (Guidelines 10/20206, para 36). A notice withheld from the subject under UU Pasal 50 still leaves the notice to the lembaga under huruf b in place.
Huruf b names the lembaga as the second addressee: the body UU Pasal 58 provides for and the President establishes. PP Pasal 114 ayat (1) huruf b repeats it, and PP Pasal 116 ayat (2) sends the incident documentation to the same body. No provision of the PP names another recipient in the meantime, and PP Pasal 223 bridges only the wait for the Peraturan Lembaga on processing.
Until the Lembaga is established, the notice under huruf b has no addressee in either instrument. Where the notice to the subject is also withheld under UU Pasal 50, a breach outside the cases of ayat (3) can pass without any notice under this Law.
Ayat (2) sets the minimum content: the data exposed, when and how they were exposed, and the handling and recovery effort. PP Pasal 114 ayat (3) repeats it, and the elucidation reads when and how to include a description of the failure and its impact. PP Pasal 114 ayat (4) adds the contact of the PPDP or another contact point. That covers Article 33(3) GDPR except the categories and approximate numbers of subjects and records concerned.
All three items are framed on data that are terungkap, exposed. The elucidation to ayat (1) defines the failure by confidentiality, integrity and availability, and the EDPB treats loss of access or destruction as an availability breach (Guidelines 9/20224, paras 17 to 19). A ransomware lockout that exposes nothing must still be notified under ayat (1), on a form built for disclosure.
Neither instrument lets the information follow in phases, as Article 33(4) GDPR does for incidents that take time to investigate (Guidelines 9/2022, paras 56 and 57). A controller at the 3x24-hour mark sends what it has, and a later supplement waits on the Peraturan Lembaga that PP Pasal 119 calls for. UU Pasal 57 ayat (1) lists ayat (1) and ayat (3) of this article but not ayat (2), so the content is enforced only through the notice itself.
Ayat (3) adds a duty to inform the public in certain cases, which the elucidation illustrates, antara lain, by a failure that disrupts public services or seriously affects the public interest. PP Pasal 115 ayat (1) writes those two examples as the conditions of the duty and drops the antara lain, and PP Pasal 115 ayat (2) says the notice is given generally through electronic or non-electronic media.
The PP sets no deadline and no content for the public notice; the 3x24-hour period of PP Pasal 114 ayat (1) is written for the notices to the subject and the Lembaga. Both matters wait on the Peraturan Lembaga under PP Pasal 119. The duty is sanctioned in UU Pasal 57 ayat (1) and PP Pasal 184 ayat (1), so a controller can be sanctioned over a notice whose timing and content no text yet fixes.
Decisions of national data protection authorities on the same GDPR provisions, found through The DPO (thedpo.eu), an index of European enforcement decisions, and linked to the authority's own copy. A reference, a date or a fine is shown only where that copy states it. The DPO's summaries are machine-written and none is used here.
The DPO tags 931 national decisions since 25 May 2018, from 29 countries, as citing Article 32; most come from Denmark (155), Romania (152) and Latvia (70). Listed here are the most recent, one per country, each opened at the authority and found to cite the article.
The DPO tags 143 national decisions since 25 May 2018, from 20 countries, as citing Article 33(1), 33(3), 33(4) and 33(5); most come from Poland (36), Latvia (32) and Denmark (15). Listed here are the most recent, one per country, each opened at the authority and found to cite the article.
The DPO tags 69 national decisions since 25 May 2018, from 15 countries, as citing Article 34(1) and 34(3); most come from Poland (35), Denmark (8) and Lithuania (4). Listed here are the most recent, one per country, each opened at the authority and found to cite the article.
What GDPRhub's commentary on the same GDPR provisions cites, less what is listed above, each linked to the official copy. It is further reading: the commentary on this page does not rest on it.
Cited in its whole commentary on Article 32. Read it on GDPRhub
Cited in its commentary on Article 34(1) and 34(3). Read it on GDPRhub
The Lembaga. No decision of the Lembaga exists, because it has not been established (CNBC Indonesia, 16 September 2026).